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Abstract 
This paper examines how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and 
motivates him to deliver an unobservable effort when potential operators are wealth-
constrained. It shows that either a pooling or a separating contract can arise in 
equilibrium. In a separating contract, the more capable potential operator is either 
selected more often but awarded a smaller share of profit, or selected less often but 
awarded a larger share of profit.    
JEL Classification Numbers: D440, D820, L140. 
Key words: Optimal contract; Wealth constraint; Asymmetric information; Allocation 
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1. Introduction 
Optimal contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection have 
received considerable attention in the literature, but most studies ignore wealth 
constraints. In practice, economic parties often are wealth-constrained. For example, 
CEOs in large corporations usually have little wealth relative to the assets they control. 
Entrepreneurs typically lack the funds required to develop and market their own 
inventions, and so seek the financial support of venture capitalists. Therefore, it is 
important to examine optimal contracts in the presence of wealth constraints.  
This paper examines how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and 
motivates him to deliver unobservable effort. Potential operators have limited wealth and 
private knowledge of their ability. The wealth constraints are shown to influence optimal 
contracts in two fundamental ways. First, wealth constraints prevent the project owner 
from receiving the full value of the project. Furthermore, profit sharing results in the 
equilibrium, which diminishes the effort supplied by the operator. Second, wealth 
constraints can prevent a high-ability potential operator from outbidding his low-ability 
counterpart. As a result, the project sometimes is assigned to an operator of lower ability. 
Together, these two effects imply that wealth constraints give rise to diluted incentives 
and ex post allocation inefficiency in the equilibrium. 
When the abilities of potential operators are common knowledge, the project 
owner always selects the more capable potential operator. However, more interestingly, 
the operator’s share of realized profit can either increase or decrease with his ability, 
depending on the nature of his production technology. This is because shares of the 
realized profit constitute the only source of compensation for both the project owner and 
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the project operator when potential operators have no initial wealth. Under some 
production technologies, the project owner finds it optimal to motivate a more capable 
operator by awarding him a larger share of profit, because doing so induces a larger 
increase in the probability of success and therefore a larger increase in expected total 
surplus. However, under some other technologies, the project owner finds it optimal to 
award a more capable operator a smaller share of profit because doing so does not reduce 
the operator’s effort substantially but secures a larger share of realized profit for the 
owner.  
When the project owner cannot observe the abilities of the potential operators, she 
must consider both how to select the desired operator and how to motivate the selected 
operator. The project owner would prefer to select a high-ability potential operator more 
frequently, but the only way the project owner can do so without inducing the low-ability 
operator to exaggerate his ability is to couple a higher probability of operation with a 
smaller share of realized profit. However, a smaller share of profit reduces a more 
capable operator’s incentive to deliver effort and therefore the expected total surplus. 
Under some production technologies, the project owner finds it is optimal to select a 
more capable operator more often but award him a smaller share of profit. Under other 
technologies, the effort reduction of a more capable operator resulting from a smaller 
share of profit becomes so large that the project owner finds a pooling contract optimal or 
even selects a more capable operator less often but awards him a larger share of profit (to 
ensure substantial effort supply). Consequently, when potential operators are privately 
informed about their abilities, either a pooling or a separating contract can arise in 
equilibrium. The nature of the optimal contract depends on the elasticity of an operator’s 
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expected profit of operation with respect to the reward for success. In a separating 
contract, the more capable potential operator is either selected more often but awarded a 
smaller share of profit, or selected less often but awarded a larger share of profit. 
This analysis extends the work of Lewis and Sappington (LS) [7, 8] who analyze 
a special case of the model considered here. LS adopt a functional form in which the key 
elasticity does not vary with the operator’s ability. Consequently, for the reasons 
explained below, a separating equilibrium is optimal in the setting analyzed by LS, and 
the more capable operator is always selected more often but awarded a smaller share of 
profit.  However, wealth constraints commonly exist in a broad class of economic 
settings that apparently have different production technologies. Also, both pooling 
contracts and separating contracts are frequently observed in many relevant practical 
settings. This study demonstrates that pooling contracts and other forms of separating 
contracts can be optimal in more general settings. Furthermore, it characterizes the 
optimal separating and pooling contracts for a broad class of production functions.  
These findings are developed and explained as follows. Section II describes the 
central elements of our model. Section III examines the general properties of an optimal 
contract. Section IV summarizes the results and concludes with future research 
directions. The proofs of all formal results are provided in the appendix. 
 
2. Elements of the Model 
The owner of a project seeks to select an operator and motivate him to operate the 
project. The project will either succeed and provide a gross return V > 0, or fail and 
provide zero gross return. The success or failure of the project is observed publicly. 
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),( ep θ  is the probability that the project succeeds for , where e represents the 
effort that the operator delivers and θ represents the operator’s ability. The operator’s 
effort is not observable to the project owner. Effort is necessary for success so 
that
0≥e
0)0,( =θp . I assume that higher effort and ability increase the probability of 
success at a decreasing rate so that ),( ep θθ > 0, ),( ep e θ > 0, ),( ep θθθ < 0, 
),( ep ee θ < 0. Higher ability is also assumed to increase the marginal impact of effort 
so that ),( ep e θθ > 0. In addition, marginal effect of effort at e = 0 is assumed to be 
sufficient large so that ∞→+→ ),(lim0 epee θ . 
There are two potential operators in our model. Each potential operator’s ability θ 
is the realization of an identical and independent random variable. The realization is Hθ  
with probability q and Lθ  with probability 1- q, where HL θθ <<0 . Only the potential 
operator is privately informed about his own ability from the outset. For simplicity, I 
assume that both potential operators have zero initial wealth and an opportunity wage of 
zero. Furthermore, I assume the potential operators have the same marginal cost of effort, 
which is constant and normalized to unity. 
Let ijμ  denote the probability the owner assigns the project to a potential operator 
when he reports ability iθ  and his counterpart reports ability jθ , for . Also 
let  denote the equilibrium payment the owner makes to the operator who reports 
ability 
{ HLji ,, ∈ }
iT
iθ  when he is selected and the project succeeds. No transfer payment occurs 
between the owner and the operator when the project fails. Call { ijμ , } the allocation iT
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that a potential operator receives when he reports ability iθ  and his counterpart reports 
jθ , for . { }HLji ,, ∈ 1 
The timing in the model is as follows: 1) The project owner offers the contract to 
both potential operators. 2) Each potential operator decides whether to accept the 
contract. No penalty is imposed on a potential operator who rejects the contract. 3) If 
both potential operators decide to accept the contract, each of them reports his own 
ability to the project owner.2 4) The owner selects a project operator according to the 
contract; 5) The selected operator chooses his effort level and manages the project; 6) At 
the end of the operation, the outcome of the project is observed, and payment is made as 
promised in the contract. 
       
3. Properties of the Optimal Contract 
3.2. A benchmark solution. 
As a benchmark, I first examine the optimal contract when potential operators 
only have private information about their effort supply but not their abilities.  
A selected operator chooses his effort level to maximize his profit of operating the 
project, which is the difference between the expected payment from the owner and the 
cost of his effort. Therefore, when T is the payment for success, an operator with ability θ  
chooses an effort level such that:  
{ eTepTe
e
}−≡ ),(maxarg),( θθ                                           (2.1) 
The equilibrium expected  profit for a potential operator with ability Hθ  is: 
),()),(,(),( TeTTepT HHHH θθθθπ −= .                    (2.2) 
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The corresponding equilibrium expected profit for a potential operator with ability Lθ  is: 
),()),(,(),( TeTTepT LLLL θθθθπ −= .                          (2.3) 
For each type of operator, the project owner wants to maximize her net expected 
return, which is the difference between the expected gross return from the project and the 
expected payment to the operator. Therefore, for each type of operator, the project 
owner’s problem is: 
]))[,(,( iiiiT TVTepWMaxi
−= θθ       
Subject to 
0),()),(,(),( ≥−= iiiiiiii TeTTepT θθθθπ ,                                                              (2.4)                               
0≥iT , where i ∈{L, H}.            (2.5) 
Constraint (2.4) is the individual rationality constraint which guarantees the 
participation of both types of potential operators. Constraint (2.5) ensures the transfer 
payments to be nonnegative, which reflects the fact that both potential operators have 
zero initial wealth.   
If the potential operators were not wealth-constrained, the project owner could 
charge the operator an up-front fee which equals the project’s maximum expected value, 
, where )())(,( ** θθθ eVep − { }eVepe
e
−≡ ),(maxarg)(* θθ , and set . Then the 
selected operator would choose to deliver the socially optimal effort  and he 
would earn zero expected profit. This mechanism is equivalent to selling the project to 
the operator at its maximum expected value. When both potential operators have zero 
initial wealth, the project owner’s only source of compensation is her share in the 
VT =
)(* θe
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project. However, the share in the project is also the only source of incentive for the 
operator. This changes the properties of the optimal contract as shown in Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1. Suppose each potential operator’s ability is observable and wealth 
constraints exist. Then, in the optimal contract: 
(i) The project owner always shares the realized profit with the operator 
( ) who then delivers less than the socially optimal effort; 1/0 << VT
(ii) The project owner’s expected surplus increases as the selected operator’s ability 
increases; 
(iii) The optimal payment to the operator for success can either increase or decrease 
with the operator’s ability conditional on his production technology. 
 
Because the share of the realized profit is the only source of incentive for the 
operator, as property (i) reports, the project owner has to promise to share the realized 
profit with the operator in order to motivate the operator.  Since the project owner’s only 
source of compensation is her share of the realized profit, the selected operator is 
rewarded only part of the realized profit. Consequently, he delivers less than the socially 
optimal level of effort . Given the optimal sharing of the realized profit, property 
(ii) indicates that the project owner’s expected surplus increases as the operator’s ability 
increases. Therefore, the project owner will always award the project to the potential 
operator with the highest ability when she can observe each potential operator’s ability. 
)(* θe
Furthermore, when the share of the project is the only source of compensation for 
both the project operator and the project owner, the project owner utilizes the high-
ability operator’s superior productivity in an interesting manner. The high-ability 
operator has a relatively high marginal probability of success at any given level of effort. 
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Thus, the project owner may prefer awarding a larger share of profit to a high-ability 
operator, because it can lead to a larger increase in the probability of success and 
therefore a larger increase in total surplus. On the other hand, the project owner may 
prefer awarding a smaller share of profit to a high-ability operator, because doing so may 
not reduce the operator’s effort substantially but increases the share of realized profit that 
the owner keeps. Property (iii) of Proposition 1 shows that, in an optimal contract, the 
operator’s share of profit can either increase or decrease with his ability, depending on 
the production technology. In other words, under some technologies, the operator’s 
ability and the share of profit he receives act as substitutes from the owner’s perspective. 
Under other technologies, they can act as complements.  
When the operator’s probability of success is , for example, the 
optimal share of profit for the operator is 
θαθ eep =),(
θ , which increases with θ . On the other hand, 
when the operator’s probability of success is  as in LS, the optimal share 
of profit for the operator is 
γθθ eep =),(
γ , which does not vary with θ . 
  Propostion 2 provides a sufficient condition under which the owner will optimally 
award a high-ability operator a smaller share of profit. 
  
Propostion 2: Suppose 0),( ≤ep eee θ and ≤),( ep ee θθ 0, then when the abilities of 
operators are observed publicly, the owner will optimally award a larger share of profit to 
a low-ability operator than to a high-ability one. 
  
While the conditions in Proposition 2 involve the third derivatives of the success 
function that are not easy to interpret, they are straightforward to check for any specific 
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function and they do indicate that it can be optimal to award a smaller share of the 
realized profit to a high-ability operator than to a low-ability operator. 
For later use, define the class of production technologies, under which the 
operator’s share of the realized profit decreases with his ability, the share-reversal 
production technology. Formally, let be the optimal payment for success for an 
operator when his ability, θ, is observable to the project owner, then the operator’s 
production technology  is share-reversal if 
∗T
0
*
<θd
dT . 
 
3.2. The optimal contract. 
The results from the benchmark problem illustrate the effect of wealth constraints 
on the optimal contract when there is no adverse selection problem. However, in reality, a 
project owner often does not have perfect knowledge of potential operators’ abilities. For 
example, venture capitalists seldom have perfect information about entrepreneurs’ 
abilities, and company owners often are not able to assess perfectly the qualifications of 
potential managers.  This section investigates the properties of optimal contracts when 
potential operators are privately informed about their abilities. 
In this case, the equilibrium expected profit for a potential operator is the product 
of his expected profit from operation and his probability of operation. The equilibrium 
expected  profit for a potential operator with ability Hθ  is: 
[ ][ ]HLHHHHHHHHH qqTeTTep μμθθθθ )1(),()),(,()( −+−=∏ .              (2.6) 
The corresponding equilibrium expected profit for a potential operator with ability Lθ  is: 
[ ][ ]LHLLLLLLLLL qqTeTTep μμθθθθ +−−=∏ )1(),()),(,()( .                    (2.7) 
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The project owner wants to maximize her net expected return, which is the 
difference between the expected gross return from the project and the expected payment 
to the operator. Therefore, the project owner’s problem is: 
      ])1(22)][))(,(,([ 2
, HLHHHHHH
P
T
qqqTVTepMax μμθθμ −+−=∏
                +               ])1(2)1(2)][))(,(,([ 2 LHLLLLLL qqqTVTep μμθθ −+−−
Subject to 
0)( ≥∏ Hθ ;                                                                                                                 (2.8) 
0)( ≥∏ Lθ ;                                                                                 (2.9) 
[ ][ ]LLLHLHLLHHH qqTeTTep μμθθθθ )1(),()),(,()( −+−≥∏ ;     (2.10) 
[ ][ ]HLHHHLHHLLL qqTeTTep μμθθθθ )1(),()),(,()( −+−≥∏ ;    (2.11) 
0, ≥LH TT ;                       (2.12) 
1≤+ LHHL μμ ;           (2.13) 
21≤HHμ ;               (2.14) 
21≤LLμ ;            (2.15) 
0,,, ≥LLLHHLHH μμμμ .                          (2.16) 
The first term in the owner’s objective function is the owner’s expected return 
when the operator has ability Hθ  times the probability that the selected operator has 
ability Hθ , and the second term is the owner’s expected return when the operator has 
ability Lθ  times the probability that the selected operator has ability Lθ .  Therefore, the 
sum of these two terms equals the owner’s expected net return from the project. (2.8) and 
(2.9) are the individual rationality constraints that guarantee the participation of both 
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types of potential operators. (2.10) and (2.11) are the incentive compatibility constraints 
that ensure both types of potential operators truthfully report their abilities. (2.12) ensures 
the transfer payments to be nonnegative. (2.13), (2.14), (2.15) and (2.16) bound the 
operation probabilities between 0 and 1. 
When the project owner cannot observe the abilities of the potential operators, she 
must consider both how to select the desired operator and how to motivate the selected 
operator. The project owner could always assign the same contract to both potential 
operators and specify a particular share in the project and a particular probability of 
operation that does not vary with ability. However, as is evident in the benchmark 
problem, the project owner prefers to select a high-ability potential operator more 
frequently, because his greater productivity generates greater expected surplus for the 
project owner. The only way the project owner can do so without inducing the low-ability 
operator to exaggerate his ability is to couple a higher probability of operation with a 
smaller share of realized profit. The properties of optimal contracts with unobservable 
ability depend on whether the potential operators’ production technology is share-
reversal.  
If their production technology is share-reversal, the project owner prefers to offer 
two separate contracts: (A) a relatively high probability of operation coupled with a 
relatively small share in the project, intended for a high-ability potential operator, and (B) 
a relatively low probability of operation coupled with a relatively large share in the 
project, intended for a low-ability potential operator.  
However, if the potential operators’ production technology is not share-reversal, 
the above separating contract may not be optimal. This is because while selecting a high-
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ability operator more often can increase the project owner’s expected surplus, reducing a 
high-ability operator’s share of profit can substantially reduce his effort supply and 
consequently reduce the owner’s expected surplus. When the latter effect dominates the 
former, the project owner may find a pooling contract is optimal or even prefer to select a 
high-ability operator less often but award him a larger share of profit (to ensure 
substantial effort supply). Therefore, when the potential operators’ production technology 
is not share-reversal, the project owner’s preference regarding separating contracts is not 
clear. 
For example, *T  does not vary with the operator’s ability θ  when the operator’s 
success probability is . In this case, a high-ability operator is always 
selected more often but awarded a smaller share of profit.
γθθ eep =),(
3 On the other hand, *T  
increases with the operator’s ability θ  when the operator’s success probability is 
. Numerical examples in Table 1 shows that either a pooling contract or a 
separating contract can arise in equilibrium. Further, in a separating contract, a high-
ability operator is selected less often but awarded a larger share of profit.  
θαθ eep =),(
These findings are summarized in Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose potential operators are privately informed about their abilities 
from the outset and wealth constraints exist.  
(i) Either a pooling or separating contract can arise in equilibrium; 
(ii) The project owner always shares the realized profit with the operator, and the 
selected operator always earns positive expected profit;  
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(iii) If the potential operators’ production technology is share-reversal, the high-
ability operator is always selected more often, but is awarded a smaller share 
of profit in a separating equilibrium; 
(iv) If the production technology is not share-reversal, the high-ability operator 
can be selected less often and awarded a larger share of profit in a separating 
equilibrium. 
  
It remains to determine when the project owner prefers a separating contract and 
when he prefers a pooling contract. To analyze this issue, define 
),(
),(
, T
T
dT
TdE T θπ
θπ
π ≡ . In words,  is the elasticity of a potential operator’s 
expected profit of operating the project with respect to the payment for success. 
TE ,π
 
Proposition 4.  Suppose the potential operators’ production technology is share-reversal. 
Then 
(i) A pooling contract is optimal when  is strictly increasing in the 
operator’s ability 
TE ,π
θ ; 
(ii) A separating contract is optimal when  is non-increasing in the 
operator’s ability 
TE ,π
θ . 
  
 The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is as follows. When the production 
technology is share reversal, the project owner prefers to select the high-ability operator 
more often but award him a smaller share of profit. However, when the elasticity of an 
operator’s expected profit of operating the project with respect to the payment for success 
increases with his ability, the marginal rate of substitution between his probability of 
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operation and his payment of success, 
P
T
pT ∂Π∂
∂Π∂=Π
)(
)(MRS θ
θ , is also increasing with his 
ability. Consequently, a high-ability operator will be less willing than a low-ability 
operator to reduce his share of profit in exchange for a higher probability of operation. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 1, given the two separate contracts A and B that we 
discussed earlier, a high-ability operator will prefer the option A designed for the low-
ability operator in which a relatively low probability of operation is coupled with a 
relatively large share of profit. On the other hand, a low-ability operator will prefer the 
option B that couples a relatively high probability of operation with a relatively small 
share of profit.  As a result, the project owner cannot implement any separating contracts 
with properties described in property (iii) of Proposition 3. In this case, a pooling contract 
is optimal. A pooling contract specifies the same share in the project and the same 
probability of operation (0.5) for all potential operators.  
 
T 
A
B
p 0 
)( HθΠ  
)( LθΠ  
 
 
 
 
 
0.5  
Figure 1.  The Potential Operators’ Preference for Contract Options When  
is Strictly Increasing in 
TE ,π
θ . 
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In contrast, when the aforementioned elasticity is non-increasing in the operator’s 
ability, a high-ability operator is at least as willing to reduce his share of profit in 
exchange for a higher probability of operation as a low-ability operator is. Therefore, a 
high-ability operator will weakly prefer a relatively high probability of operation coupled 
with a relatively small share of profit, and a low-ability operator will weakly prefer a 
relatively low probability of operation coupled with a relatively large share of profit. As a 
result, separating contracts as characterized in property (iii) of Proposition 3 can be 
implemented, and are optimal.4 
 
Proposition 5 provides two additional general properties regarding the optimal 
contract. 
 
Proposition 5: Suppose potential operators are privately informed about their abilities 
from the outset and wealth constraints exist. 
(i) A separating contract, where a high-ability operator is selected more often but 
awarded a smaller share of profit, is not optimal if  is strictly increasing 
in the operator’s ability 
TE ,π
θ ; 
(ii) A separating contract, where a high-ability operator is selected less often but 
awarded a larger share of profit, is not optimal if  is strictly decreasing in 
the operator’s ability 
TE ,π
θ . 
 
When the elasticity of an operator’s expected profit of operating the project with 
respect to his payment for success is strictly increasing in his ability, a high-ability 
operator is less willing to reduce his share of profit than a low-ability operator in 
exchange for a higher probability of operation. Therefore, a separating contract, where a 
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high-ability operator is selected more often but awarded a smaller share of profit, cannot 
be implemented.  In contrast, when the elasticity is strictly decreasing in ability, a high-
ability operator is more willing to reduce his share of profit in exchange for a higher 
probability of operation. In this case, a separating contract, where a high-ability operator 
is selected less often but awarded a larger share of profit, cannot be implemented.  
It can be verified that  increases with the operator’s ability TE ,π θ  when the 
operator’s success probability is . The numerical examples in Table 1 
reveal that the high-ability operator is selected less often but awarded a larger share of 
profit in separating contracts in this case, consistent with Proposition 5. 
θαθ eep =),(
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and 
motivates him to deliver unobservable effort when potential operators are wealth-
constrained. It shows that wealth constraints have significant effects on the structure of 
optimal contracts. First, wealth constraints prevent the project owner from receiving the 
full value of the project and give rise to profit sharing in the equilibrium. Second, wealth 
constraints prevent a high-ability potential operator from outbidding his low-ability 
counterpart. As a result, the project can be assigned to potential operators of lower 
abilities. Consequently, diluted incentives and ex post allocation inefficiency arise in the 
equilibrium. 
Further, it shows that when the abilities of potential operators are common 
knowledge, the operator’s share of profit can either increase or decrease with his ability, 
depending on the prevailing production technology. When potential operators become 
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privately informed about their abilities, either a pooling or a separating contract can arise 
in the equilibrium5. In separating contracts, the more capable potential operator is either 
selected more often but awarded a smaller share of profit, or selected less often but 
awarded a larger share of profit. Which equilibrium arises depends upon the elasticity of 
operator’s expected profit from operating the project with respect to the payment for 
success and whether the production technology is share reversal. It characterizes 
conditions for separating contracts to arise, and for pooling contracts to arise.  
Our model could be usefully extended in a variety of directions. First, it could be 
optimal for the project owner to conduct preliminary contests among potential operators 
in order to better discern their abilities. The optimal design of such contests and the 
conditions under which such contests are optimal would be interesting to explore. 
Second, repeated interaction between the project owner and potential operators could be 
considered. Past performance can reveal information about an operator’s ability. It can 
also create wealth asymmetries among potential operators. How the project owner 
optimally constructs future assignments and sharing rules based upon potential operators’ 
past performance and heterogeneous wealth merits investigation. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1. It is without loss of generality that the equilibrium payment is assumed a function of 
each potential operator’s own report only. The reason is as follows. For any 
mechanism where each potential operator’s payment does not depend only on his own 
report, there exists a corresponding payment scheme that provides potential operators 
the same expected profits but depends only on each potential operator’s own report. 
Furthermore, since both project owner and potential operators are risk neutral and the 
production function is concave in effort, a deterministic payment scheme can render 
higher expected surplus to the project owner than a stochastic mechanism. 
2. As shown in section 3, both types of potential operators make positive expected profit 
from the optimal contract. Therefore, in the equilibrium, both potential operators will 
accept the optimal contract regardless of their abilities. 
3. See LS. 
4. It can be verified that  is constant in the operator’s ability TE ,π θ  when the operator’s 
success probability is  as in LS, which is consistent with Proposition 4.  γθθ eep =),(
5. There are special classes of production functions for which pooling is always induced 
in equilibrium. For example, suppose )(),( Xpep =θ , where ),( eXX θ=  and 
CeX e =),(θ (C is a scalar.). Then the first order condition of the operator’s problem 
implies 1)(),()( == CTXpTeXXp XeX θ . Therefore, the X chosen by the operator 
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does not depend on his ability level. In the presence of information asymmetry and 
wealth constraints, the project owner is indifferent between different types of 
potential operators because she is not able to extract additional rent from the high-
ability operator. A simple example of this class of production functions is 
re
ep
)(
11),( +−= θθ . 
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Table 1 
Optimal Solutions for various values of Hθ , Lθ  and q when V=2000, and α =0.001. 
(  θαθ eep =),( )
 
Hθ  Lθ  q HT  LT  HLμ  LHμ  
1 0.80 0.80 0.70 1600.00 1600.00 0.50 0.50 
2 0.80 0.75 0.70 1581.75 1581.75 0.50 0.50 
3 0.80 0.70 0.70 1575.08 1575.08 0.50 0.50 
4 0.80 0.65 0.70 1575.08 1575.08 0.50 0.50 
5 0.80 0.60 0.70 1570.84 1570.84 0.50 0.50 
6 0.80 0.55 0.70 1570.84 1570.84 0.50 0.50 
7 0.80 0.50 0.70 1570.84 1570.84 0.50 0.50 
8 0.80 0.45 0.70 1570.84 1570.84 0.50 0.50 
9 0.80 0.40 0.70 1570.84 1570.84 0.50 0.50 
10 0.80 0.35 0.70 1572.53 1290.00 0.34 0.66 
11 0.80 0.30 0.70 1575.86 1063.25 0.19 0.81 
12 0.80 0.25 0.70 1580.05 812.19 0.00 1.00 
13 0.80 0.20 0.70 1575.77 774.84 0.00 1.00 
14 0.80 0.15 0.70 1570.76 738.86 0.00 1.00 
15 0.80 0.10 0.70 1564.64 704.04 0.00 1.00 
16 0.70 0.70 0.35 1400.00 1400.00 0.50 0.50 
17 0.70 0.65 0.35 1362.07 1326.02 0.46 0.54 
18 0.70 0.60 0.35 1350.17 1238.77 0.40 0.60 
19 0.70 0.55 0.35 1350.78 1139.89 0.32 0.68 
20 0.70 0.50 0.35 1360.03 1032.46 0.25 0.75 
21 0.70 0.45 0.35 1372.13 919.44 0.18 0.82 
22 0.70 0.40 0.35 1385.71 803.53 0.12 0.88 
23 0.70 0.35 0.35 1390.34 699.87 0.00 1.00 
24 0.70 0.30 0.35 1393.24 599.95 0.00 1.00 
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25 0.70 0.25 0.35 1394.92 506.82 0.00 1.00 
26 0.70 0.20 0.35 1316.33 447.04 0.00 1.00 
27 0.70 0.15 0.35 1210.48 384.27 0.00 1.00 
28 0.70 0.10 0.35 1032.22 306.29 0.00 1.00 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Proof of Property (i):  
      For θ ∈{ Lθ , Hθ }, ∞→+→ ),(lim0 epee θ  guarantee that the operator will make positive 
expected profit whenever . Furthermore,  if , while  
if  T = V, or T = 0. So, in equilbirum, we have , and both types of operators 
can make potive expected profit from operation.       
           Q.E.D 
0>T 0>∏P 0>> TV 0=∏P
0>> TV
Proof of property (ii): 
      Taking the partial derivative of  with respect to θ and applying the Envelope 
Theorem provides  
P∏
[ 0)(),()),(,()),(,( >−+=∂∏∂ TVTTepTep ee
P
θθθθθθ θθ ] .   (A.1) 
Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
      The first order condition of the project owner’s problem is: 
0),()),(,()()),(,( =−+−=∂
∏∂ TTepTVTep
T eTe
P
θθθθθ .    (A.2) 
From the operator’s problem,  
TTepe 1)),(,( =θθ .                              (A.3) 
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Then, 1)),(,( =TTepe θθ .        (A.4) 
Totally differentiating equation (A.4) and applying the Envelope Theorem provides 
0)),(,()),(,()),(,( =++ θθθθθθθ θ TdTepdTTepTdeTep eeee .    (A.5) 
So, 0
)),(,(
1
)),(,(
)),(,(
2 >−=−= TTepTTep
Tep
dT
de
eeee
e
θθθθ
θθ
,    (A.6) 
and 0
)),(,(
)),(,( >−=
Tep
Tep
d
de
ee
e
θθ
θθ
θ
θ .       (A.7) 
Substituting (A.4) and (A.6) into (A.2) implies 
0
)),(,(
1)()),(,( 3 =−−−=∂
∏∂
TTep
TVTep
T ee
P
θθθθ .    (A.8) 
Total differentiating equation (A.8) gives 
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−
=
3243
23
),(
),(),(
),(
3)(
),(
1),(),(
)),(,(
),(),(),(
),(),(),(
Tep
Tep
Tep
TV
Tep
Tep
Tep
epTep
T
TVepTep
d
dT
ee
Teee
eeee
Te
ee
eeeee
e
ee
ee
θ
θθ
θθθθ
θθ
θθθθθθ
θ
θθ
θθ
. 
           (A.9) 
Since ),( ep θθ , ),( ep e θ > 0,  <),( ep ee θ 0, 0),( ≤ep eee θ and  
≤),( ep ee θθ 0,  equation (A.9) implies 0<θd
dT .      
Taking the derivative of (A.8) with repect to T again provides 
0
),(
),(),()(
),(
23),(),( 3242
2
<⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+−=∂
∏∂
Tep
TepTV
Tep
TVTep
T ee
Teee
ee
Te
P ee θ
θθ
θθθ ,  (A.10) 
which implies that the second-order condition with respect to T is satisfied. 
Q.E.D 
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Lemma 1: In the optimal contract, 1=+ LHHL μμ . 
Proof: Assume that 1=++ εμμ LHHL  and 10 << ε  in the optimal contract. 
Furthermore, define  
[ ] σμμτ )1()1(1 qqq HLHH −−+=  and [ ] σμμτ qqq LLLH )1(2 −+= .  
σ is a scalar which satisfies ε
μμ
ε
μμσ
q
qq
q
qq LLLHHLHH )1(
)1(
)1( −++−
−+≥  so that 
εττ ≤+< 210 . 
      Now define  and and replace 1τμμ += HLHLo 2τμμ += LHLHo HLμ and LHμ  in the 
presumed optimal contract with and , respectively. oHLμ oLHμ
Constraint (2.10) becomes 
[ ][ ]LLLHLHLLHHH qqTeTTep μμθθθσθσ )1(),()),(,()11()()11( −+−+≥∏+ , 
(A.11) 
 and constraint (2.11) becomes  
[ ][ ]HLHHHLHHLLL qqTeTTep μμθθθσθσ )1(),()),(,()11()()11( −+−+≥∏+ . 
           (A.12) 
      (A.11) and (A.12) imply both constraints (2.10) and (2.11) still hold. And it is 
apparent that all the other constraints still hold while the value of  has increased. 
Therefore 
P∏
1=++ εμμ LHHL  can not be part of optimal contract.     
           Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2: In the optimal contract, 21== LLHH μμ . 
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Proof: Assume 21=+ εμ HH  and 210 << ε  in the optimal contract, and define 
21=+= εμμ HHHHo  and εμμ q
q
HLHL
−−= 1o . Now replace HHμ and HLμ  in the 
presumed optimal contract with  and . Since oHHμ oHLμ HLHH qq μμ )1( −+  is the only 
term in constraints (2.10) and (2.11) that has HHμ and HLμ , and  
HLHLHLHH qqq
qqqqq μεεμμμ )1()
2
1()
1
)(1(
2
1)1( −+−=−−−+=−+
oo  
                                 HLHH qq μμ )1( −+= .      (A.13) 
(A.13) implies both constraints (2.10) and (2.11) still hold. And it is apparent that all the 
other constraints holds. Then we check the value of . Since  
is the only term in that has 
P∏ HLHH qqq μμ )1(22 2 −+
P∏ HHμ and HLμ , 
)
1
)(1(2)(2)1(22 22 εμεμμμ
q
qqqqqqq HLHHHLHH −−−++=−+
oo  
                                          ,    (A.14) HLHH qqq μμ )1(22 2 −+=
(A.14) implies the value of are still the same. Therefore replacing P∏ HHμ and HLμ  in 
the presumed optimal contract with  and  gives us an contract which is 
equivalent to the original contract.  
o
HHμ oHLμ
      Since 1≤+ LHHL μμ  and εμμ q
q
HLHL
−−= 1o , we know , which is 
a contradiction to Lemma 1. Therefore 
1<+ LHHL μμ o
21<HHμ  can not be part of optimal contract. 
Applying the same argument to LLμ , we can show that 21=LLμ  in the optimal 
contract.           
Q.E.D 
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 Lemma 3: In equilibrium, the project owner receives higher expected surplus when a 
more capable operator is selected. 
      First define 
P∏  as the project owner’s expected net return from the optimal pooling 
contract, and  and  as the optimal payments for potential operators when their 
abilities are publicly observed, where the subscript represents the operator’s ability level. 
For convenience, let  
∗
HT
∗
LT
)))(,(,( HHHH
P
H TVTep −= θθπ  and . )))(,(,( LLLLPL TVTep −= θθπ
      Then project owner’s objective function is 
])1(2)1(2[])1(22[ 22 LHLL
P
LHLHH
P
H
P qqqqqq μμπμμπ −+−+−+=∏ . (A.15) 
(A.15) and Lemma 2 imply 
])1(2)1[(])1(2[ 22 LH
P
LHL
P
H
P qqqqqq μπμπ −+−+−+=∏ .   (A.16) 
      Suppose  in the optimal contract. Then (A.15) implies  PL
P
H ππ ≤
P
LLH
P
LHL
P
L
P qqqqqq πμπμπ =−+−+−+≤∏ ])1(2)1[(])1(2[ 22 .  (A.17) 
Since  is the owner’s expected net return from a low-ability 
operator’s operation when she can observe potential operators’ ability levels,  
)))(,(,( ∗∗ − LLLL TVTep θθ
)))(,(,( ∗∗ −≤ LLLLPL TVTep θθπ .       (A.18) 
And it is easy to show that 
)))(,(,()))(,(,( ∗∗∗∗ −>− LLLLLLHH TVTepTVTep θθθθ .    (A.19) 
(A.17), (A.18) and (A.19) imply 
)1)())(,(,()))(,(,( qTVTepqTVTep LLLLLLHH
P −−+−<∏ ∗∗∗∗ θθθθ .  (A.20) 
By definition,  
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)1)())(,(,()))(,(,( qTVTepqTVTep LLLLLLHH
P −−+−≥∏ ∗∗∗∗ θθθθ .  (A.21) 
      Therefore 
PP ∏<∏ , which implies the presumed solution is not an optimal 
solution.           
           Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Proof of Property (iii): 
      Suppose  in the equilibrium. Then constraint (2.11) implies that LH TT >
HLHHLLLH qqqq μμμμ )1()1( −+>−+ .     (A.22) 
      From Lemma 1 and 2, we know 21== LLHH μμ  and LHHL μμ −= 1 . Then (A.22) 
implies  
2
1<HLμ  and 21>LHμ .        (A.23) 
      Also note that Property (ii) in Proposition 1 implies  <  and (A.10) implies ∗HT
∗
LT
0)]))(,(,([ 2
2
<∂
−∂
T
TVTep θθ .        (A.24) 
      Three cases need to be checked. 
Case I: ; ∗≥> LLH TTT
      Lemma 4 implies that . Therefore (A.16) and (A.23) imply PL
P
H ππ >
)1(]
2
1)1(2)1[(]
2
1)1(2[ 22 qqqqqqqq PL
P
H
P
L
P
H
P −+=−+−+−+<∏ ππππ  (A.25) 
      Since  , (A.18) and (A.24) imply ∗∗ >≥> HLLH TTTT
)1)())(,(,()))(,(,()1( qTVTepqTVTepqq LLLLLLHH
P
L
P
H −−+−<−+ ∗∗∗∗ θθθθππ  
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P∏< .        (A.26) 
      Therefore 
PP ∏<∏ , which implies the presumed solution is not an optimal 
solution. 
Case II: ; LHH TTT >≥∗
      From (A.25), . Since , and by 
definition , (A.24) implies  
)1( qq PL
P
H
P −+<∏ ππ LHHL TTTT >≥> ∗∗
)))(,(,( ∗∗ −≤ HHHHPH TVTep θθπ
)1)())(,(,()))(,(,()1( qTVTepqTVTepqq HHLLHHHH
P
L
P
H −−+−<−+ ∗∗∗∗ θθθθππ  
     
P∏< .        (A.27) 
      Therefore 
PP ∏<∏ , which implies the presumed solution is not an optimal 
solution. 
Case III: . ∗∗ ≥>≥ HLHL TTTT
      Again, from (A.25), . )1( qq PL
P
H
P −+<∏ ππ
      Since , (A.24) implies  ∗∗ ≥>≥ HLHL TTTT
qTTVTTepqq LHLHHH
P
L
P
H )2
))(
2
,(,()1(
∗∗∗∗ +−+<−+ θθππ  
PLHLH
LL q
TTVTTep ∏≤+−++
∗∗∗∗
)
2
))(
2
,(,( θθ .  (A.28) 
      Therefore 
PP ∏<∏ , which implies the presumed solution is not an optimal 
solution. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Propostion 4: 
Proof of Property (i):  
Constraint (2.10) requires that  
                             
HLHH
LLLH
LH
HH
qq
qq
T
T
μμ
μμ
θπ
θπ
)1(
)1(
),(
),(
−+
−+≥ ,                         (A.29) 
and constraint (2.11) requires 
),(
),(
)1(
)1(
LL
HL
HLHH
LLLH
T
T
qq
qq
θπ
θπ
μμ
μμ ≥−+
−+ .                            (A.30) 
Therefore, constraints (2.10) and (2.11) together requires 
),(
),(
),(
),(
LL
HL
LH
HH
T
T
T
T
θπ
θπ
θπ
θπ ≥ .                                          (A.31) 
It can be shown that 0
)(
)( >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
L
H
dT
d
θπ
θπ
, when 0, >θ
π
d
dE T . Since  in any 
separating contracts according to Proposition 2, Condition (A.31) cannot hold when 
LH TT <
0
)(
)( >⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
L
H
dT
d
θπ
θπ
. Therefore, no separating contract is optimal when 0, >θ
π
d
dE T . 
 Q.E.D 
 
Proof of Property (ii):   
Assume that a pooling contract is optimal. Define T  as the optimal payment for 
success in the pooling contract. Apparently each potential operator’s probability of 
operating is 1/2.  
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According to Proposition 2, it is straightforward that ** HL TTT >> , where  
and  are the optimal payment of success for corresponding potential operator when the 
project owner can observe the potential operator’s ability. 
*
HT
*
LT
Define TTTH Δ−≡ , where 0* >Δ≥− TTT H .  We further define HLμΔ  so that  
[ ] [ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Δ−−≡⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Δ−+− HLHHHHLHHHHHH qTeTTepqTeTTep μθθθμθθθ 21),()),(,()1(21),()),(,( . 
           (A.32) 
By continuity,  
1
2
1
2
1 <Δ+< HLμ         (A.33) 
as TΔ  is sufficiently close to zero. 
 From (A.32), 
),()))(,(,(
),()),(,(
2
1
)1(
2
1
TTeTTTTep
TeTTep
q
q
HHH
HHH
HL
HL
Δ−−Δ−Δ−
−≡
Δ−
Δ−+
θθθ
θθθ
μ
μ
.   (A.34) 
Since 0
)(
)( <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
H
L
dT
d
θπ
θπ
, 
),()))(,(,(
),()),(,(
),()))(,(,(
),()),(,(
TTeTTTTep
TeTTep
TTeTTTTep
TeTTep
LLL
LLL
HHH
HHH
Δ−−Δ−Δ−
−>Δ−−Δ−Δ−
−
θθθ
θθθ
θθθ
θθθ
. 
(A.35) 
Therefore,  
),()))(,(,(
),()),(,(
2
1
)1(
2
1
TTeTTTTep
TeTTep
q
q
LLL
LLL
HL
HL
Δ−−Δ−Δ−
−>
Δ−
Δ−+
θθθ
θθθ
μ
μ
.   (A.36) 
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Furthermore, as )))(,(,()))(,(,( TVTepTVTep HHHHHH −>− θθθθ  and 
)))(,(,()))(,(,( TVTepTVTep LLHHHH −>− θθθθ , the project owner is strictly better off 
with a contract in which the payments of success for the high-ability potential operator 
and the low-ability operator respectively are  and HT T , and the probabilities of operation 
are 
2
1== LLHH μμ , HLHL μμ Δ+= 2
1  and HLLH μμ Δ−= 2
1 . Based upon (A.32), (A.33) 
and (A.36), It can be readily verified that this new contract satisfies all the constraints.   
Therefore, a pooling contract is not optimal. 
Q.E.D. 
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